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  In the aftermath of the European Union’s eastern enlargement many interesting 
issues concerning the effects of the enlargement have surfaced.  These issues range from 
international and domestic politics to a host of economic concerns.  Our interest in this 
paper rests with economics.  What will be the impact on Spain if structural and regional 
funds are diverted to new member states?  What impact will workers from the east have 
on Germany’s labor market?  How will the CAP be affected by the new members?  
Although, the issues concern both the old members and the new members, the focus here 
is on the impact of the enlargement on the new member states from an economic 
perspective. 
  This paper employs a particular economic methodology to evaluate the static 
welfare gains and losses from the trade policy options facing a nation.  With relatively 
modest data requirements, the welfare effects of joining the EU will be measured for 
some of the many states that were part of the enlargement.  The paper consists of three 
parts.  The first presents a model of a small open economy and derives a measure to 
evaluate policy alternatives.  The second part applies the framework developed to 
measure the impact of trade policy alternatives open to potential new member states of 
the European Union.  This involves taking the model to the real world, using data to 
provide answers for policy makers.  The third section summarizes the results and 
compares this method of investigating the welfare effects of economic integration with 
other studies.   
  Joining the union was an obvious outcome for many eastern European countries, 
but the circumstances surrounding the terms of membership are negotiable.  In particular, the allocation of funds in the EU budget is a contentious issue and how these funds are 
distributed will affect the welfare of the new member states, as well as the fifteen old 
member states.  Providing policy makers with alternative welfare outcomes will enable 
them to evaluate policy alternatives more effectively.   
 
THE MODEL 
  Today there exist many stages of economic and political integration and in the 
trade area; these take the form of different preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  This 
has been a part of the decline in trade barriers and the rapid growth in international trade 
since the end of World War II.  Part of the reduction in trade barriers has been a result of 
the multilateral talks sponsored by the GATT.  But part of this change has been the 
agreements between various countries to lower barriers among themselves.  Such 
agreements are known as preferential (or discriminatory) trade agreements.  Today 
almost all of the member countries of the WTO participate in one of the 194 preferential 
agreements that have been officially recognized by the WTO (World Bank). 
  The two main types of PTAs are free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions 
(CUs).  The main difference between them is how the partners treat nonmember 
countries.  In a customs union the association of countries eliminates barriers to trade 
among members but erects a common barrier against nonmembers.  The best known 
example of a CU is the European Union.   Countries that form a FTA also eliminate 
barriers among members, but maintain their own individual trade barriers against 
nonmembers.  Also, sometimes a third type of agreement is often defined.  A common 
market is a customs union that allows free movement of factors of production among 
member states.     Our attention centers on the economic welfare associated with various trading 
arrangements.  Our model concerns a small country.  By small we mean that the country 
has no effect on either world prices or the prices of potential partner countries.  It seems 
suitable for the countries we will study.  It is well known that for a small country welfare 
is greatest when there is unilateral free trade.  But welfare associated with alternative 
trading agreements depends on the terms of trade established and needs further study to 
rank the alternatives.  A relative simple measure can be used to consider the relevant 
alternative trading scenarios.  The benchmark for our analysis will be the case where a 
country sets its own tariffs. 
  Figure 1 shows a standard 
international trade model.  TT’ depicts the 
production possibilities curve for a small 
country producing goods X (the composite 
exportable good) and M (the composite 
importable good).  When there is free trade 
production occurs at Q0 and consumption at 
C0, so that the price line pw represents the 
world trading price ratio.  Real income in 
terms of the exportable is Y0. 
  If the country levies an import tariff residents face a higher relative price for the 
import than the world price, but can trade with the rest of the world at world prices.  So 













Tincome falls to Y1.  The tariff of Y1
T-Y1 is redistributed to residents.  Keeping with PTA 
theory literature this will be the base case.   
  Consider what happens if this country enters a CU.  The price ratio faced by 
residents will most likely change for both domestic and international trade.  Let’s 
consider each composite good separately.  The composite import good comes from three 
alternative sources: domestic producers, CU member producers, and non-member 
producers.  The import good from all three sources will always sell for the world price 
plus the CU tariff. 
  The composite export good sells in part to domestic consumers, in part to CU 
partners, and in part to the rest of the world.  Exports to the rest of the world will be at 
world prices, since a small country cannot affect world prices.  Exports to CU partners 
and trade within the domestic market can occur at higher prices because of the CU tariff.  
Therefore, the weighted average of sales to the rest of the world (at world prices) and 
within the CU (at world prices + CU tariff) determines the impact of CU membership on 
the price of the exportable good faced by domestic residents.  Of course, if X were a 
homogeneous good, the higher price in the CU means that domestic producers would 
choose to sell all X output to the CU.  But, the export is a composite of goods that sells to 
the rest of the world at world prices and within the CU at CU prices, so it will sell in all 
three markets. 
  By joining a CU the prices of both imports and exports can increase.  Therefore, 
the relative price of the domestic country’s exportables could either increase or decrease.  
To demonstrate this change and how it affects the decisions of domestic consumers and 
producers and therefore the economic welfare of the home country, the change is divided into two distinct effects.  Two things occur when a CU is formed.  First the combination 
of goods X and M produced will change because the relative price ratio changed.  Call 
this the domestic price effect.  Second, the change in the relative prices is a change in 
terms of trade for the domestic residents when trading with the rest of the world and with 
CU partners.  Call this the international trade or tradeables price effect.  Figures 2 and 3 
are used to demonstrate these effects.   
Domestic Price Effect 
  Before joining the CU the home 
country produces at Q1, so the base case 
relative price ratio is tangent at Q1.  It is 
not shown in Figure 2 in order to avoid 
cluttering the graph and focus on the 
domestic price effect.  The dotted lines 
represent the relative price ratio for world 
prices.  As we know, after joining a CU 
the domestic price of both imports and 
exports may increase.  Therefore, the price ratio faced by domestic producers may 
increase or decrease as a result of membership.  An increase in the relative domestic price 
of exportables will increase production in the direction of the nation’s comparative 
advantage and result in production at Q2 and real income (at world prices) of Y2.  A 
decrease results in Q3 and Y3.  The production effect is positive (Y2 - Y1) when the 










Y3International Trade Price Effect 
  In Figure 3 point Q 
represents production 
equilibrium after joining the CU.  
The domestic price effect can be 
negative or positive, we cannot 
tell from the graph.  The 
domestic price effect depends on 
the CU price ratio relative to the 
base case price ratio.  The line 
denoted by PCU is the relative price ratio faced by domestic residents after joining the CU.  
Point C is equilibrium consumption after membership.  In other words all decision 
makers now face CU prices and trade only takes place at CU price ratios.  Therefore, the 
change called the international price effect depends on the difference between the terms 
of trade prior to membership and the terms of trade after membership.  If the CU price 
line is steeper than the world price line then the international trade price effect is positive.  
In this case the world price ratio is denoted by p’w and real income increases from Y’2 to 
Y’3, because the new terms of trade now favor the home country.  If joining the CU 
decreases the relative price of the exportable (CU price line is flatter than the world price 
line), the terms of trade turn against the home country and real income decreases from Y2 
to Y3 after membership.  This is a negative international trade price effect.   
  A third possible effect must be noted.  The tariff revenues collected by the 











p wamong members.  This compensation can be negative or positive depending upon the 
budget arrangements of the CU.  This differs from the base case where the single country 
redistributes all tariff revenues to residents.  A lump-sum transfer from the fiscal 
authority shifts the budget line right or left depending on whether the transfer is positive 
or negative.  For example in Figure 3 a positive transfer would shift pCU to the right 
which is welfare improving and a negative transfer would shift pcu to the left, diminishing 
welfare for the home country. 
  The sum of the three changes will determine whether economic welfare increases 
or decreases due to CU membership.  Since each of the terms can be either positive or 
negative it is necessary to pursue this further to see the impact of membership on net 
welfare.  Therefore, it’s necessary to be able to quantify these terms. 
Quantifying 
  The gains or losses associated with alternative trade policies can be quantified 
(see Leith).  The national budget for the base case, where a country sets its own tariff is 
expressed in terms of domestic prices.  The value of spending equals the value of income 
from production plus the value of tariffs collected and rebated to domestic residents.   
(1) P  ⋅ C = P ⋅ Q + (P - P*) ⋅ (C - Q) 
  where  P  = the vector of domestic relative prices 
    P* = the vector of world relative prices 
    C  = the vector of domestic consumption 
    Q  = the vector of domestic production 
Now expand the budget constraint to focus on domestic prices, world prices, and the 
tariff which is the wedge between the two prices. (2)  [P* + (P - P*)] ⋅ C = [P* + (P - P*)] ⋅ Q + (P - P*) ⋅ (C - Q) 
After rearranging, this expression shows the value of real income (Y) in terms of world 
prices: 
(3)  Y = P* ⋅ C = P* ⋅ Q - (P - P*) ⋅ (C - Q) + (P - P*) ⋅ (C - Q) 
The last two terms on the right hand side of equation (3) clearly sum to zero.  They 
represent the value of import duties collected and rebated to domestic residents.  
However, under alternative trading arrangements the collection and rebating of duties 
may be treated in different ways, so we keep these terms in the expression for real 
income. 
  We are especially interested in real income under alternative trading arrangement, 
like a customs union or a free trade agreement.  Under a CU the wedge between the 
domestic and world prices is the CU common external tariff.  If the CU tariff differs from 
the home tariff than joining the CU would result in different domestic relative prices, and 
hence different vectors of production and consumption.  And importantly while there 
may be some transfer from the CU, there is no automatic compensation to domestic 
residents as shown in equation (3).  Therefore, equation (3) is revised to represent real 
income for the alternative trading arrangement.   
(4)  Y’ =  P* ⋅ Q’ - (P’ - P*) ⋅ (C’ – Q’)  + TR 
where the primed values (’) represent the alternative regime and TR is the net value of 
international transfers for the alternative trading arrangement.  It is easy to compute by 
how much real income changes for various alternative trade policies, by comparing 
equation (4) with the base case represented in equation (3).   
  The change in real income from (3) to (4) is calculated as (5)  ΔY = P* ⋅ ΔQ -[(P’- P*) ⋅ (C’ – Q’)]  + TR 
The three terms on the right hand side of (5) correspond to the three different effects 
discussed in section 2 above.   
  The term P* ⋅ ΔQ is the domestic price effect.  It measures the change in real 
income caused by changes in domestic production responding to relative price changes 
resulting from CU membership.  It can be positive or negative, depending on whether the 
price changes move production in the direction of the country’s comparative advantage or 
away from it. 
  The term [(P’ - P*) ⋅ (C’ – Q’)] is the international trade or tradeables price effect.  
It consists of the sum of the cost of higher prices paid on imports from all sources and the 
benefit of the higher prices received by exports to CU partners.  This measures the 
change in real income produced by the terms of trade change that occurred after joining 
the CU.  This term can be negative or positive depending upon whether the CU price 
ratio is greater or less than the world price ratio.   
  The last term, TR, the international transfer, could be either positive or negative 
depending on the CU fiscal arrangement. 
 
CASE OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
  Now we can apply the framework developed in the sections above to evaluate 
trade policies for nations about to join the European Union.  For all cases the basis of 
comparison is continuing the existing set of trade policies. 
  The first to consider are the cases where relative prices do not change.  In both of 
these cases it will be assumed that the new entrant’s tariffs will be the tariffs for the CU.  Simplest, is joining the EU and not changing the current tariff structure.  The second case 
with no change in relative prices is to replace the customs union of the EU with a free 
trade area (FTA), with each of the existing members maintaining the current tariff as its 
own. 
  Next we will a consider case where some relative prices do change.  The third 
case is like the first case, except the existing EU tariffs become the relevant tariff 
structure for the customs union.  Of course, as is well known it would be optimal for a 
small country to eliminate all tariffs and adopt free trade.  Since this rarely seen in the 
real world, it will not be considered here.  But it would yield the greatest net welfare.   
  We will consider these alternative policies for data from Poland   The trade 
statistics are classified by 13 broad industrial product categories tabulated by the GATT’s 
Integrated Data Base (Finger, Ingco, and Reineke). 
Case 1 – Join EU, but Continue with Existing Tariffs 
This compares the present tariff arrangement for Poland, assuming that upon joining the 
EU, the EU adopts the Polish tariff schedule.  Neglecting any costs in moving between 
the two states the effect of continuing as is versus joining the EU would be: 
(i)  The domestic price effect on production would be zero, because the tariff rate in 
both states would be the same. 
(ii)  The tradeables price effect ((P’ - P*) ⋅ (C’ – Q’)) consists of two parts.  One, the 
cost of the higher prices paid on Polish imports from all sources.  Two, the gains 
from higher prices received on Polish exports to EU partners. 
(iii)  The international transfer effect, which is uncertain.  It is not clear what the value 
of this transfer will be for Poland.  One possible avenue to consider is the size of structural funds for Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.  In 1995 they ranged 
from roughly $8200 million to $1400 million.  In population Poland is more like 
Spain, but its economy measured in terms of GDP is about one quarter the size of 
Spain’s.  Exactly what the transfer to Poland will be after joining is difficult to 
predict.  The average for the four countries will be used for now. 
These effects were calculated for 1995 and presented in Table 1, Case 1.   
The results are interesting.  Ignoring any transitional cost, participating in a CU with the 
EU countries, but maintaining its existing tariffs, the real national income would be 
higher by $2390 million or about 2.0 percent of Poland’s GDP for 1995 (1995 GDP is 
$119,052 million).  This depends greatly on the amount of the transfer, and if the transfer 
were closer to the $1400 million amount, Poland would be better off not joining the CU.   
Case 2 – FTA with current EU members 
If Poland were to consider a less restrictive trade policy option with the members of the 
EU one alternative to consider is an FTA with current EU members.  This is similar to the 
existing relationship between the EU and the European Free Trade Association.  To 
evaluate the gains and losses associated with such an arrangement we will assume that 
each member maintains the existing Polish tariff as there own.  Hence, there would be no 
domestic price effect and domestic production, consumption, and trade patterns would 
remain the same.  With an FTA there is no international transfer, which is a major 
difference between the two regimes.  Of course, in this case Poland would collect the 
tariff revenues on the 40% of imports that come from outside the FTA.  These changes, 
reported in Table 1, Case 2, add up to less than 1 percent of Poland’s GDP. 
 Case 3 – Join EU with existing EU tariff 
The more realistic case to consider, but substantially more difficult to analyze is full 
membership in the EU and changing the tariff structure to match the common external 
tariff (CET) of the EU.  In this case the relative prices will change and there will be a 
domestic price effect as well as a tradeables price effect.  Again assuming away any costs 
associated in moving from the base case to EU membership the effects would be: 
(i)  The two part tradeables price effects.  One, the price of imports would now be the 
world price plus the EU CET.  For some goods the price would increase and for 
others the price would decrease, plus imports will change in response to the price 
changes.  This impact could be negative or positive depending on the various 
directions of changes across commodity classes.  Two, the price of exports to 
partners would now be the world price plus the CET, which represents a gain.  
Exports to the rest of the world would still be at world prices, so this would not 
change. 
(ii)  Measuring the impact of price changes on domestic production requires additional 
assumptions.  As a first approximation it is assumed that the elasticity of the 
transformation function is unity.  Hence, the change in prices from pre- to post- 
EU membership gives rise to changes in production.  In this case most tariff rates 
will fall, shifting production in the direction of Poland’s comparative advantage 
and increasing income. 
(iii)  As discussed in case 1 above, the international transfer effect is very important 
but its value is uncertain.  The number suggested above will be used. The results of these changes are reported in Table 1, Case 3.  Again, abstracting from any 
of the costs associated with joining the EU, real national income would be higher by 
$4975 million, just over 4 percent of 1995 GDP.  The transfer continues to play an 
important role in measuring the welfare effects of the trade policy change.  However, the 
other effects are both interesting and important is the domestic price effect.  Switching 
from Poland’s exiting tariff structure to the EU tariffs would positively affect the relative 
domestic price of exportables, this shifts production in the direction of the country’s 
comparative advantage, and adds to the benefits received by Poland both through the 
tradeables price effect on exports and the domestic price effect. Table 1: 
Alternative Trade Policy Options 
(millions of US dollars) 
No Relative Price Change Cases   
Case 1: EU Membership with existing Polish tariff   
    Tradeables price effect on imports from all sources  -1918 
    Tradeables price effect on exports to partners  +308 
    Domestic price effect on production  0 
    International transfer effect  +4000 
    Net gain (+) or loss (-) versus base case  +2390 
  
Case 2: FTA with current EU Members with existing Polish tariff   
    Tradeables price effect on imports from all sources  -767 
    Tradeables price effect on exports to partners  +308 
    Domestic price effect on production  0 
    International transfer effect  0 
    Net gain (+) or loss (-) versus base case  -459 
  
Relative Price Change Case   
Case 3: EU Membership with existing EU tariff   
    Tradeables price effect on imports from all source  -855 
    Tradeables price effect on exports to partners  +180 
    Domestic price effect on production  +1650 
    International transfer effect  +4000 
    Net gain (+) or loss (-) versus base case  +4975 
  
            SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A major of advantage of the approach presented and applied above is that it can be 
utilized with modest data requirements and used to evaluate trade policy options.  Of 
course there are limitations and simplifications that should be mentioned.   
  First, the costs associated in moving from one equilibrium state to another 
equilibrium are ignored.  And these costs can be quite substantial.  Even continuing to 
ignore the costs associated with political change upon joining the EU, the economic costs 
of the transition in changing production and trade patterns in response to a new set of 
relative prices is costly.  These are one time costs and must be measured against the flow 
of future gains that a policy change may bring about. 
  Second, still looking only at economic relations, PTAs effects are not confined 
only to tariff issues, but may include provisions which are beneficial to members.  For 
example, part of a preferential trade agreement may include dispute resolution 
mechanisms, transit rights, and exemption from non-tariff barriers. 
  Third, this paper relied on comparative static welfare economics, but ignored 
growth effects in considering the alternatives.  Usually though, trade policy and growth 
policy point in the same direction.   
  Fourth, in calculating the gains and losses, aggregates of importables, exportables, 
and domestic production were used.  If the data were disaggregated more, perhaps the 
changes would be different.  This is an issue that needs to be resolved in subsequent 
work.   Finally, the results for Poland provide some insights for policy makers.  It is clear 
that the issue of the international transfer is an important point in discussions between the 
old member states and new member states.   
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